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Abstract  Today is the era of Internet of Things (IoT),  millions of machines such 
as cars, smoke detectors, watches, glasses, webcams, etc. are being con- 
nected to the Internet. The number of machines that possess the ability 
of remote access to monitor and collect data is continuously increasing. 
This  development makes, on one hand, the human life more comfort- 
able, convenient, but it also raises on other hand issues on security and 
privacy.  However, this development also raises challenges for the digital 
investigator when IoT  devices involve in criminal scenes. Indeed, cur- 
rent research in the literature focuses on security and privacy for IoT 
environments rather than methods or techniques of forensic acquisition 
and analysis for IoT devices. Therefore, in this paper, we discuss firstly 
different aspects related to IoT  forensics and then focus on the cur- 
rent challenges. We also describe forensic approaches for a IoT  device 
- smartwatch as a case study.  We analyze forensic artifacts retrieved 
from smartwatch devices and discuss on evidence found aligned with 
challenges in IoT  forensics. 
 
Keywords:  Internet of Things forensics, forensic challenges, Smartwatch forensics, 
forensic acquisition and analysis. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Internet of things (IoT) is a new revolution of technology that enables 
small devices to act as smart objects. These devices are connected with 
each other by different  network media types, and the result of these 
communications is to return to the sensors by appropriate decision. The 
goal of IoT is to make lives more convenient and dynamic. For instance, 
cars can drive alone, the smart light turned off when  there is no one in 
the room, air conditioner turned on when room temperature goes be- 
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low a certain degree. Moreover, IoT devices can exchange information 
between themselves  to provide a convenient services to the owner. For 
instance, a smart player can select and play a particular song dependent 
on the blood pressure of owner which was taken from his/her smart- 
watch. Indeed, IoT technology crosses different industry areas such as 
smart city, medical care, social domains and smart home [1]. 
However,  the IoT  technology can create more opportunities  for cy- 
bercrimes to attack these areas, resulting in a direct impact on users. 
In addition, as most of all consumer technology, IoT technology is not 
designed with security in mind, as the main concern was to minimize 
the cost and size.  Therefore, these devices have shortage in hardware 
resources.  Because of this lack, most of the security tools cannot be 
installed in IoT  devices, as they require a certain space and process 
function to be run [2],  making them an easy target for cybercrimes. 
They can find the way to inject these devices in order to use them as 
weapons to attack other websites [3]. Cybercrimes with the power of 
IoT  technology can cross the virtual space to threaten human life and 
with increasing number of these crimes, which consider as one of the 
two main reasons why we need IoT  forensic. For instance, in January 
last year, FDA  warned that certain pacemakers ,which is a system that 
sends electrical impulses to the heart in order to set the heart rhythm, 
are vulnerable to hacking[4].  This  means who used the vulnerable de- 
vice in that particular time could face death, if his/her life became under 
a hacker who could control the pacemaker. The second main reason is 
IoT digital evidence is a rich and often unexplored  source of information. 
As most of IoT manufacturers  show to the customers what the product 
can provide to them but they do not mention about the process that 
happened to provide these services. For example: a LG  smart vacuum, 
which can clean the room by itself, it seems that the function is done 
its job by sensors which can detect the size and the shape of the roam 
then start clean it.  However, a group of researcher found a vulnerabil- 
ity in an LG  portal login process that allowed them to take control of 
the vacuum and consequently, giving them access to live-stream video 
from inside a home [5]. This incidence rises some important questions, 
does the LG portal record cleaning process at every time the vacuum is 
running? And where is stored! also where the process is occurred! Is 
locally or through the Cloud? 
From the forensic perspective, each IoT device will provide important 
artifacts that could help in the investigation process.  Some of these 
artifacts have not been disclosed in public that means the investigators 
should consider of these resources and how they can acquire the artifacts 
from these devices. Even though IoT has rich sources of evidence from 
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the real world application, it causes some challenges for forensics exam- 
iner including but not limited to the location of data and heterogeneous 
nature of IoT devices such as differences in operating systems and com- 
munication standards [6].  Current research in literature  focuses on IoT 
security and privacy, however, some important  aspects such as Incident 
response and forensic investigations,  have not been covered efficiently. 
Therefore, this paper will spot the light on these aspects. In this paper, 
we discuss on IoT forensics and how is different from traditional foren- 
sics and following with what are the challenges  of IoT forensics.  We also 
describe the forensic acquisition of smartwatch, an IoT device as a case 
study.  The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the 
difference between the traditional forensics vs.  IoT forensics. We then 
discuss on IoT forensics challenges in Section 3. We present our forensics 
acquisition and analysis of Apple Smart Watch in Section 4. Finally, we 
conclude and show future work in Section 5. 
 
2.          Traditional  digital  forensics vs.  IoT Forensics 
 
Digital forensics could be defined as a processing that use to iden- 
tify the digital evidence in its most original form and then performing 
a structured investigation to collect, examine and analyze the digital 
evidence. There are several aspects of difference and similarity between 
traditional and IoT forensics. In terms of evidence sources, traditional 
evidence could be computers, mobile devices, servers or gateways. In 
IoT  forensics, the evidence could be home appliances, cars, tags read- 
ers, sensor nodes, medical implants in humans or animals, or other IoT 
devices. 
In terms of Jurisdiction and Ownership, there are no differences,  it 
could be individuals, groups, companies,  governments, etc. In terms of 
evidences data types, IoT  type could be any possible format, it could 
be a specific format for a particular vendor.  However,  in traditional 
forensics could be electronic documents or standard file formats.  In 
terms of networks, IoT limitation encourages to be seen a new protocol 
that fits this limitation. However, the network boundaries  become not 
clear as the traditional network. Increasing in the blurry boundary lines, 
it makes seizing IoT forensic devices become one of the challenges  of IoT 
forensics.  In [7],  authors highlight this issue and introduced possible 
identification for the source of evidence. 
 
3.          IoT Forensics 
 
IoT technology is a combination of many technology zones: IoT zone, 
Network zone and Cloud zone. These zones can be the source of IoT 
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Digital evidences. That is, an evidence can be collected from a smart 
IoT  device or a sensor, from an internal network such as a firewall or 
a router, or from outside networks such as Cloud  or an application. 
Based on these zones, IoT has three aspects in term of forensics: Cloud 
forensics, network forensics and device level. 
Most of IoT devices have the ability to cross Internet (direct or indi- 
rect connect) through applications to share their resources in the Cloud. 
With all valuable data that store in the Cloud, it has recently became 
one of the most important targets for attackers.  In traditional digital 
forensics, the examiner can hold the digital equipment and then apply 
the investigation  process to extract the evidence.  However,  in Cloud 
forensics  [8], it is a different scenario, the evidence could be separated in 
multi-location which is rising many challenges in terms of acquisition of 
data from the Cloud. In addition, in the Cloud, examiners have limited 
control and access to seize the digital equipment and getting an exact 
place of evidence could be a challenge  [9].  Dykstra also addressed this 
challenge in one of the case study that provided about child pornography 
website. In the warrant that request the Cloud provider, should provide 
the name of the data owner, or specify the location of the data that you 
are looking for [10].  Besides, data could be stored in a different location 
in the Cloud, resulting in no evidence could be seized. In addition, as all 
Cloud services use Virtual Machine as servers, data volatile like registry 
entries or temporary Internet files in these servers could be erased if they 
not synchronized with storage devices. For instance, if these servers are 
restarted or shutdown, the data could be erased. 
Network Forensics include all different kinds of networks that IoT 
devices used to send and receive data.  It could be home networks, in- 
dustrial networks, LANs, MANs and WANs. For instance, if an incident 
occurs in IoT  devices, all logs that traffic flow that has passed throw, 
could be potential evidence such as firewalls or IDS logs [11]. 
Device Level Forensics include all potential digital evidence that can 
be collected from IoT devices like graphics, audio, video [12][13]. Videos 
and graphics from CCTV camera or audios from Amazon Echo, can be 
great examples of digital evidences in the device level forensics. 
 
3.1           IoT forensic Challenges 
 
IoT technology has presented a significant shift in investigation field, 
especially in how it interacted with data. However, there are some chal- 
lenges in terms of IoT forensics. 
 
Data  Location     Many of IoT  data are spread in different  locations 
which are out of the user control.  This  data could be in the Cloud, 
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in third party’s location, in mobile phone or other devices. Therefore, 
in IoT  forensics, to identify the location of evidence is considered as 
one of the biggest challenges can investigator faced in order to collect 
the evidence. In addition, IoT data might be located in different coun- 
tries and be mixed with other users information, which means different 
countries regulations are involved [14]. A  great case example is what 
was happened in August 2014, when a Microsoft refused to comply with 
a search warrant that seeking data stored outside the country of war- 
rant(US), making the case opened for a long period of time[15]. 
 
Lifespan limitation of digital media    Because the limitation of stor- age 
in IoT devices, the lifespan of data in IoT devices is short and data can 
be easily overwritten.  Resulting in the possibility of evidence being lost 
[16]. Therefore, one of the challenges is the period of survival of the 
evidence in IoT devices before it is overwritten. Transferring the data to 
another thing such as local Hub or to the Cloud could be an easy solu- 
tion to solve this challenge. However, it present another challenge that 
related to securing the chain of evidence and how to prove the evidence 
has not been changed or modified [16]. 
 
Cloud   service  requirement    Most of the accounts are anonymous 
users because Cloud service does not require the accurate information 
from user to sign up for their service.  It could lead to impossible to 
identify a criminal [17] .   For example, even though the investigators 
find an evidence in the Cloud  that prove a particular IoT  device in 
crime scene is the cause of the crime, it does not mean this evidence 
could lead to identify the criminal. 
 
Security   lack    Evidence in IoT  devices could be changed or deleted 
because of lack of security, which could make these evidence not solid 
enough to be accepted in law court[18][19] .For example, in the market, 
some companies do not update their devices regularly or at all or some- 
time they stop supporting the device’s framework when they focus on 
a new product with the new infrastructure. As a result, it could leave 
these devices vulnerable as hacker found a new vulnerability. 
 
Device  type    In identification phase of forensics, the digital investiga- 
tor needs to identify and acquire the evidence from a digital crime scene. 
Usually, evidence source is types of a computer system such as computer 
and mobile phone. However, in IoT, the source of evidence could be ob- 
jects like a smart refrigerator or smart coffee maker. [7]. Therefore,  the 
investigators will face some challenges.  One of these challenging is Iden- 
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tifying and finding the IoT devices in crime scene. It could the device 
terned off because it run out of battery, which make the chance to be 
found is so difficult especially if the IoT devices is very small, in hidden 
place or look likes a traditional device. Carrying the device to the lab 
and finding a space could be anther challenge that investigator could face 
in terms of device type. In addition, extracting the evidences form these 
devices is considered as anther IoT challenges as most of manufacturer 
adopts different platforms, operating systems and hardwares. One of the 
examples is the CCTV forensics  [20] where  the CCTV’s manufacturers 
applied different file system format in their devices. Retrieving properly 
artifacts from CCTV’s storage devices is still a challenges. We also show 
in [21] a new approach to carve the deleted video footprint a proprietary 
designed file storage system. 
 
Data Format     The format of the data that generated by IoT devices is 
not matching to what is saved in the Cloud. In addition, user have no di- 
rect access to his/her data and the data presents in deferent format than 
that in witch it is stored. Moreover, Data could be process using ana- 
lytic functions in different places before be stored in the Could.  Hence, 
in order to be accepted in a law court, data form should be returned to 
original format before performing analysis[7]. 
 
3.2          Limitations  in the Currently Available 
Forensic  Tools 
 
The existing tools in digital forensics field cannot fit with the het- 
erogeneous infrastructure  of IoT environment. The massive amount of 
possible evidence that are generated by a large number of IoT devices, 
it will consequently bring new challenges in the aspect of collecting ev- 
idence from distributed IoT infrastructures. In addition, since a hacker 
can monopolize  the evidence in IoT  devices because the weakness  of 
these devices in term of security, the extracting evidence from them 
maybe not acceptable in law court [9]. Moreover,  because  most of IoT 
data are stored in the Cloud, the Cloud becomes one of the main sources 
of evidence in IoT.  Hence, investigators will face some of the problems 
of collecting evidence from the Cloud, because the procedures of digital 
forensic and tools assume to have physical access to the evidence source. 
However, in the Cloud, the investigators could find a difficulty to even 
to know where the data is located [9].  In addition, the physical servers 
could have many virtual machines that belong to different owners. More- 
over, Cloud environments could not be available when a crime has been 
committed. Therefore, all of these challenges need to be addressed and 
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to find a method to work around barriers and come up with a new tool 
for IoT investigation, that can be approved by law court and achieve of 
investigators goals [12]. 
 
4.         A  Case  Study  :  Smartwatch  Forensics 
 
In this section, we present a case study on an IoT  device: an Ap- 
ple smartwatch to show that approaches for the forensic acquisition and 
analysis of IoT devices are still device-oriented.  A smartwatch is a dig- 
ital wristwatch and a wearable computing device. Digital watches are 
categorized  according to their technologies. There are smartwatches, 
activity trackers, running, multisport and smart home. Because of the 
ongoing development  of digital watches, most watches cover more than 
one technology.  A smartwatch is used like a smartphone and has mostly 
similar functions. Among others, a smartwatch shows the date and time, 
counts steps and provides various types of information. It can provide 
news, weather reports, flight information, traffic news, and receive text 
messages, e-mails, social media messages, tweets and many others. The 
connectivity of smartwatches plays an important role in the retrieval of 
collected data and information from the Internet. To be a full-featured 
smartwatch, a watch must have a good connectivity  to enable it to com- 
municate with other devices (e.g. a smartphone) and be able to work 
independently. In this case study, we investigate Apple Watch Series 2 
with the following technical specification details: 
 
Network-accessible smartwatch, no cellular connectivity. 
Dual-Core Apple S2 chip. 
Non-removable, built-in rechargeable lithium-ion battery. 
watchOS 2.3, watchOS 3.0, upgradable to watchOS 3.2. 
Wi-Fi 802.11 b/g/n  2.4GHz, Bluetooth 4.0, Built-in GPS,  NFC 
chip, Service Port. 
 
AMOLED  capacitive touchscreen, Force Touch, 272 by 340 pixels 
(38 mm), 312  by 390 pixels (42 mm), Sapphire crystal or Ion-X 
glass. 
 
Sensors: accelerometer, gyroscope, heart-rate sensor, ambient light 
sensor 
 
Messaging: SMS (tethered), email, iMessage 
 
Sound: vibration, ringtones, loudspeaker 
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It is important to note that the Apple Watch Series 2 has a hidden 
diagnostic port [22].  No official cable is available for it, so our approach 
is doing the forensics via the iPhone synchronized with the Apple Watch 
including: (i) logical acquisition with Cellebrite UFED  of relevant data 
from an Apple iPhone; (ii) Manual swipe through the Apple Watch. 
Basically, the investigators are interested in the following artifacts: GPS- 
data, heart-rate data, timestamps, MAC  address, paired devices, text 
messages and emails, call log, contact, etc. 
 
4.1  Logical  Acquisition 
 
The following findings on iPhone in relation of Apple Watch are the 
result of multiple extractions to clarify attempts and changes. The first 
hint of an Apple Watch is given in the database 
com.apple.MobileBluetooth.ledevices.paired.db 
This database can be found in the following path in the file system of 
the iPhone: 
/SysSharedContainerDomain- systemgroup.com.apple.bluetooth/Library/Database/ 
This Database contains the UUID, name, address, resolved address, 
LastSeenTime and LastConnectionTime.  Since the Apple Watch does 
not have a separate file system on the iPhone, Apple Watch data has to 
be searched for the inside application data on the iPhone. In our case, 
the Apple Watch was used in the operation time with following appli- 
cations: Health App, Nike Plus App, Heartbeat App, Messages, Maps 
App.  We describe the artifacts  retrieved from some of these applications 
in the following sub-sections. 
 
Health App:  The healthdb.sqlite database on Path /var/mobile/Library/Health/ 
contains the Apple Watch as a source device for health data (1). 
 
Nike Plus GPS: The Nike Plus GPS app contains a folder com.apple.watchconnectivity. 
The path is /Applictions/com.nike.nikeplus-gps/Documents/inbox/. There 
is a folder named 71F6BCC0-56BD-4B4s-A74A-C1BA900719FB.  This 
indicates the use of an Apple Watch. The main database in the Nike Plus 
GPS application is activityStore.db in Path /Applications/com.nike.nikeplus- 
gps/Documents/.  ActivityStore.db contains an activity overview, last- 
ContiguosActivity, metrics, summaryMetrics and tags, which are highly 
relevant for the investigation. 
 
GPS Data:    The GPS  data found in the tables metrics and tags is 
shown in detail below. Longitudes and latitudes are generated by the 
Nike Plus application and saved into the tables with a related timestamp. 
9 Alabdulsalam, et al.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alabdulsdam, et d.  9 
 
 
 
 
Based on this information,  we can create  map with  the  GPS data  in 
Google maps (2). 
 
Analysis: For the  logical acquisition, the software Cellebrite  UFE.O 
and 4PC were mainly used.  These  tools helped to  perform a logical 
acquisition. In the file system of the iPhone, information (i.e. UUID and 
name) of the paired Apple Watch could be found. Indeed, information 
about last connection was also found. After retrieving information about 
the watch, we investigated  the file system in relation to the applications 
used with the Apple  Watch.   Some applications contain information 
about the paired Apple Watch as a source device as well. A lot of data 
on the iPhone were generated  by the Apple Watch and come from the 
Apple Watch. 
In summary, the iPhone contains data about workouts that have been 
manually started by the user while wearing the Apple Watch. But heart 
rate data, steps data and sleep data are recorded while wearing the 
Apple Watch even when no applications have been started manually. All 
data are provided with timestamps in different formats. In addition, the 
survey of law enforcement authorities and previous explorations revealed 
that GPS  data were never found on or in relation to smartwatches. In 
the practical approach, GPS  data generated from the application Nike+ 
GPS  on the Apple Watch was found on the iPhone. 
 
4.2          Manual  Acquisition 
 
To  determine what data is stored on the Apple Watch Series 2, a 
manual investigation in the form of manual acquisition through device 
screen is used. This method of investigation was used because no phys- 
ical access was possible. This variant was used to prove that the watch 
not only generates data but also contains data directly on the watch 
and can be used as an independent device. Before using the watch as 
an independent device, it must have been paired with an iPhone and 
authenticated on the same WiFi network. After this process had been 
carried out, the iPhone was turned off. This is only necessary to write 
messages or emails, or to take phone calls. For any other forensic acqui- 
sition, as is shown in the next sections, no connection to the watch is 
needed. 
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Message    First  the messages  were checked.  It was possible to look 
at all iMessages and text messages that had been synchronized to the 
watch before turning off the iPhone.  After putting the watch in flight 
mode, text messages and iMessages could still be read. We also tried to 
write dictated iMessages and text messages directly from the watch to 
any person, with the flight mode off. It was possible to send iMessage 
directly from the watch to the receiver. Indeed, text messages could be 
written on the watch. However, a click on the send button did not send 
the message, but rather saved it on the watch.  After turning on the 
iPhone, this message was sent as well. 
 
Pictures     Pictures were also synchronized to the watch before turning 
off the phone. To prove that copies of the pictures were undoubtedly  on 
the watch and not in the Cloud, the watch was put in flight mode. The 
pictures were still on the watch. 
 
Application The applications HeartRate, HeartWatch, Activity, Maps, 
Workout, Nike+ Run,  Twitter and Instagram were browsed through. 
The HeartRate application contains only data about the last and cur- 
rent heart rate measure. HeartWatch, a third party application, contains 
a little more data. This includes pulse, daily average, training data and 
sleep tracking data. The application for recording any kind of workout 
is Apples Workout. This  application shows very little data about the 
last workout done and recorded. It only contains the type, length and 
date of the workout. Nike+ Run also contains very little data. Only the 
distance run in the last workout is displayed to the investigators. Both 
Twitter and Instagram can only be used if an iPhone is connected to 
the watch. If the iPhone is turned off, an indication that no phone is 
connected is shown. 
 
Email     Reading e-mails on the watch works in the same way as reading 
iMessages and text messages. When the iPhone is powered off, mails can 
be received, opened and sent simply and independently from the iPhone. 
After putting the Apple Watch in flight mode, as can be seen from the 
plane icon, mails can still be read. 
 
Calendar    In the calendar application, it is possible to see entries made 
by the user, but this is restricted to entries starting from the day before 
manual acquisition until seven days in the future. This is also possible 
in flight mode. 
 
Contacts and Phone    Contacts are also saved on the watch indepen- 
dent of the status of the iPhone. The phone can be turned off and the 
watch can be disconnected from all networks, but contacts remain on 
the watch. All contacts can be displayed with all contact details saved 
on the iPhone. The phone application also contains a call log and the 
favorites list.  Although the iPhone is powered  off and the watch is in 
flight mode, the investigator has the possibility to see all voicemails and 
listen to them. Additionally, the phone number origin and the date and 
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time of the incoming voicemail are displayed.  After clicking the play 
button, the voicemail is played. 
 
Analysis    Since physical access to the Apple Watch is not available, 
manual acquisition in the form of a search through the screen is currently 
the only method to see what is saved and stored on the Apple Watch 
itself. Our research shows that the watch can be used as a standalone 
device independent of the iPhone. Furthermore, many artifacts that are 
very important for investigators, as the survey revealed,  were found on 
the Apple Watch.  These include artifact of iMessages, text messages, 
pictures, workout data, heart rate data, map search data, emails, calen- 
dar entries, contacts, call logs, and voicemails. For manual acquisition 
to be possible, a smartwatch must be unlocked. If an Apple Watch is 
locked with a pin code there are no options to unlock the smartwatch 
except using the correct pin code. 
 
5.          Conclusion  and Future  Work 
 
In this paper we present firstly different aspects related to IoT foren- 
sics as well as challenges in acquiring and analyzing evidence from IoT 
devices. We also reviewed some current approaches in this context. How- 
ever, most of them only focuses on the extension of traditional forensics 
process to adapt the IoT forensics. Through our case study, we notice 
that current digital forensic tools can be used at some stages in whole 
IoT process but there is still missing a general and efficient IoT forensic 
model or process that could assist the investigators to cope with these 
challenges today. That is also what we are working on as a future work. 
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